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Financing International Environmental Governance:
Lessons from the United Nations Environment Programme
by Maria Ivanova
Financing for the global environment is scattered among many institutions and, without an
overview of total financial flows, often considered scarce. This issue brief begins an analysis
of the financial landscape by focusing on the anchor institution for the global environment,
the UN Environment Programme. It examines the relationship between institutional form and
funding and offers insights into innovative financing.

The original proposal of the
Environment Fund suggested
that the largest consumers
of energy contribute on an
escalating curve to the fund.

In 1972, at the first UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, the governments of 113 countries agreed to create the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP). Upon its establishment, UNEP received a mandate to institutionalize
the integrative concept of the “environment” across existing UN agencies and to improve
cooperation and communication between them. Catalyzing and coordinating environmental action within the UN system and beyond were among the core functions of the new,
anchor institution for the global environment.1 To assist in the effective fulfillment of these
functions, the governments instituted UNEP’s Environment Fund, which would finance the
costs of new environmental initiatives within the UN system and assist developing countries with their environmental actions. Over time, however, the Environment Fund became
the primary mechanism for financing UNEP’s own programs rather than those of the UN
system. Moreover, while the environmental agenda expanded, the Fund’s resources decreased in real terms.
Expanding the donor base, increasing funds availability, and ensuring stable and predictable financial flows are currently top priorities in international environmental governance.
Contemporary institutional reform proposals, therefore, emphasize the need for innovative
financial mechanisms for the environment.2 Some scholars and policy makers also argue
for a change in UNEP’s institutional status from a programme, a subsidiary body in the
United Nations, to a specialized agency on the grounds that its budget would then comprise assessed rather than voluntary contributions3 and the organization would be able to
institute innovative financing.4 This brief analyzes the relationship between institutional
form and funding and suggests that a simple causal argument connecting the two could be
misleading. It also highlights the fact that UNEP’s financial mechanism, the Environment
Fund, was envisioned as an innovative instrument for an expanding environmental agenda
and, if revitalized, could create opportunities for securing financial resources adequate to
the task at hand.

Institutional Form and Funding: What Causality?
Compared with most of its peers, UNEP’s annual budget of $217 million is small, especially in light of its ambitious mandate to “provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment.” Many of the specialized agencies–ILO, UNESCO,
FAO, and WHO—have annual budgets ranging from $360 million to $2.3 billion (see
Figure 1). Some scholars explain UNEP’s lower level of financing by its status as a
UN subsidiary body and the requisite reliance on voluntary contributions. Specialized agencies, they argue, “can avail themselves of more resources and hence influence.”5 The assumption linking the institutional form of a specialized agency to a
large financial base and therefore influence could, however, be misleading.
While some specialized agencies have budgets larger than UNEP’s, others’
resources are comparable or even smaller—WTO, UNIDO, and WMO, for
example (see Figure 1 and accompanying legend for the full names of the
organizations). In addition, voluntary contributions do not automatically
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translate into low volume. Indeed, the data in Figure 1 point
to the opposite. The four largest annual budgets in the UN system for 2010 (in excess of $3 billion per year) are those of four
subsidiary bodies that rely solely on voluntary funding—UNDP,
WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR. Figure 1 also highlights that even
specialized agencies, whose core budget comes from assessed
contributions, depend heavily on voluntary contributions.
WHO, FAO and UNESCO all rely on voluntary funding for more
than 50 percent of their budget.

Three critical concerns about environmental financing require
immediate attention by scholars and by policymakers: 1) roles
that governments and the public at large expect international
organizations to perform, 2) adequacy of available funds for effective delivery of these purposes, and 3) reliability of resource
flows. Operational and normative roles require different levels
of financing. In the environmental field, a number of organizations perform both roles without the necessary coordination
and collaboration often resulting in duplication and inefficient
use of resources.6 As the environmental agenda expands and
environmental activities become embedded into most organizations at national and international levels, it is critical to assess both the resources available and the resources necessary
to deliver the requisite results. To date, however, there has been
no comprehensive overview of environmental funding. Proposals
for a financial tracking system for the environment similar to
the global, real-time database of humanitarian aid managed by
UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs7 are gradually gaining traction. Finally, stability, predictability and reliability of resources are critical to effective performance. UNEP’s
financial resources have fluctuated dramatically over time as
the subsequent analysis will show and any serious proposal for
environmental governance reform needs to address the root
causes of these oscillations.

Change in institutional form to a specialized agency might
therefore not be the single most important factor that would
lead to an increase in UNEP’s financial resources as subsidiary
body status does not by itself limit funding. Other features, such
as mandate, size, and location are important determinants of
the scale of financing. Institutions with clear operational mandates (UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR) hold significantly
larger budgets than those with normative mandates (OCHA,
WTO, and UNEP). Larger staff size and multiple locations also
require larger resources. What the financial data also show,
however, is that institutional authority and influence do not
derive from resources alone. The World Trade Organization, an
oft-cited example of significant global influence, operates with
a budget at the lower end of the spectrum.

UNDP

$4,762
$4,022

WFP
UNICEF

$3,256

UNHCR

$3,007
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FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation
ILO: International Labor Organisation
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP: UN Development Programme
UNEP: UN Environment Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA: UN Population Fund

$2,000

UNHCR: UN High Commissioner on
Refugees
UNICEF: UN Children’s Fund
UNIDO: UN Industrial Organisation
WFP: World Food Programme
WHO: World Health Organisation
WMO: World Meteorological Organisation
WTO: World Trade Organisation

$3,000
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other resources

Figure 1: Annual budgets of select UN bodies for 2010, in millions of current USD
Budget data sources: Annual reports and other official documents on the organizations’ websites. See Endnotes.
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Change in institutional form to a specialized agency might not be the single
most important factor that would lead to an increase in UNEP’s financial
resources since subsidiary body status does not by itself limit funding.
Purpose and Performance of the Environment
Fund

The Voluntary Fund should be of such size as to guarantee that financing will not be a limiting factor to all
necessary action. United States participation in this
Fund should be exemplary and a reflection of the fact
that we are the world’s major polluter.12

Seeking to ensure that “efforts to improve the global environment [do not] go forward without the means to act,” the United
States led the creation of a United Nations Environment Fund
providing both the intellectual concept and 40 percent of the
Fund’s resources. In his address to the US Congress on 8 February 1972, President Richard Nixon proposed the creation of the
Fund “with an initial funding goal of $100 million for the first 5
years … to help to stimulate international cooperation on environmental problems by supporting a centralized coordination
point for United Nations activities in this field.”8 The President
acted on the recommendation of the US Secretary of State’s
Advisory Committee on the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, a group of scholars and policymakers who
produced extensive analysis of all aspects of the conference in
preparation for the US position.

Following the US lead, thirty-two governments contributed to
the Environment Fund in its first year and almost double—60
governments—contributed in UNEP’s second biennium, 1974–
1975. Over time, the Environment Fund grew from $60 million per biennium in the 1970s, when the organization gained
ground, to close to $180 million in 2008–2009. This threefold
increase in the capitalization of the Environment Fund is only
true, however, in nominal (or current) contributions.13 In real
terms, the Environment Fund plummeted by 44 percent from
1977 to 1987 and has not yet reached the highs of $160 million
per biennium that UNEP attracted in the 1970s and then in the
early 1990s in the run-up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.

The committee’s original proposal of the Environment Fund
suggested that the largest consumers of energy contribute on
an escalating curve to the fund: “A formula derived from each
nation’s consumption of energy could provide the basis for the
suggested participation in the United Nations Voluntary Fund
for the Environment. Or, it might provide the basis for a longrange system of funding, which could be a matter of assessment
rather than voluntary participation.”9 Governments, however,
did not implement this idea of energy-pegged contributions,
which would be predictable and fair and encourage a shift toward sustainable energy production and consumption.

The four-decade trend depicted in Figure 2 thus shows that the
original intention to grow the Fund proportional with intensifying environmental problems was never truly realized. To the
contrary, over time, countries decreased their investments in
the Environment Fund. This dynamic is not true for all individual governments. Only a few countries’ contributions to the Environment Fund (the United States, Japan, Russian Federation)
have decreased significantly in real terms (Figure 3). However,
since UNEP’s donor base is very narrow—only fifteen countries
account for about 90 percent of the Environment Fund contributions—fluctuations in government priorities and attention
can be particularly impactful. Thus, despite the rise in Environment Fund contributions by the Netherlands, United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Italy, and others, the cumulative effect has been
negative.

Rather, they agreed to create the voluntary Environment Fund
to support UNEP’s catalyzing and coordinating role in the UN
system. The voluntary character of the contributions allowed
President Nixon to approve $40 million in US funding for the
new UN body without excessive Congressional oversight at a
time when the United States was cutting funding to the United
Nations. While the Fund comprised solely voluntary contributions, its proponents in the US State Department acknowledged that industrialized countries held a responsibility to improve environmental conditions and should provide the bulk of
the finances required. Participation by smaller nations—with
symbolic amounts of $1,000 per year—was encouraged as a
means of emphasizing that all have a stake in international
environmental protection.10 An allocation from the UN regular
budget would cover the costs of servicing UNEP’s Governing
Council and the Secretariat.11
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$160

$120
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$40

Importantly, the initial vision for the Environment Fund emphasized the expectation that its resources would increase
as the environmental agenda expanded. The US Secretary of
State’s Advisory Committee wrote about the Fund:

Current Environment Fund

…we believe that $100 million is a beginning. However, this amount should be viewed as a minimum,
a starting figure. It is not yet clear how much money
will be required for adequate environmental action.

Constant Environment Fund

Figure 2: Environment Fund overview, in current and constant USD
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Figure 3: Trends in the size of top 15 donor contributions to the Environment Fund, 1972–2009, in constant USD
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The Soviet Union, the fifth-largest donor to the Environment
Fund (Figure 4), is a case in point. The country had been a
significant contributor to UNEP in financial terms as well as
through political, technical, and human resources support until it ceased to exist in 1991. On average, the Soviet Union contributed approximately $7.3 million a year to UNEP’s Environment Fund from 1975 to 1991. Soviet contributions accounted
for 12.1 percent of the Environment Fund during that period.
By comparison, the United States contributed 28.6 percent of
the Environment Fund during the same time, the United Kingdom 5.7 percent, and France 4.0 percent. From 1992 to 2009, the
Soviet Union’s successor, the Russian Federation, oversaw a decline in contributions to $0.47 million a year (0.8 percent of the
Environment Fund). UNEP thus lost one of its most significant
donor countries, and the downward trend in the Environment
Fund illustrated in Figure 2 can be explained partly by the disappearance of the Soviet Union.
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Figure 4: Top 15 Environment Fund contributors, 1972–2009,
in millions of constant USD
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Since UNEP’s donor base is very narrow — only fifteen countries account for
about 90 percent of the Environment Fund contributions — fluctuations in
government priorities and attention can be particularly impactful.
Widening and deepening UNEP’s donor base is indeed necessary. In reality, 35 percent of UNEP’s donor countries have
contributed less than what in 1972 was considered a symbolic amount—$1,000 per year, or $5,000 per year in 2009 terms.
Thus, even an expansion of UNEP’s donor base, while necessary, is not sufficient. A system of minimum contributions as
envisioned at the time of the Environment Fund’s creation
might be a useful complementary mechanism. The Voluntary
Indicative Scale of Contributions (VISC) that UNEP initiated
in 2003 might offer a foundation on which to build a more robust financing system that would ensure stable, adequate, and
predictable funding for UNEP. The issues surrounding the VISC
system will be discussed in a subsequent Issue Brief in this series.
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priorities. For donor governments, such funds ensure targeted
accountability and allow for greater flexibility in mobilizing
funds for a particular purpose.
In the environmental field, the earmarks trend took hold with
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer,15 which entered into force in 1989. The Montreal Protocol is considered one of the most successful international
environmental treaties and has the largest trust fund within
UNEP. The significant financial resources devoted to the treaty
can be seen both as a reason for and an indicator of the treaty’s
effectiveness. From 1988 to 2009, governments have invested
$2.5 billion in the Montreal Protocol—an amount equivalent
to combined Environment Fund and earmarked contributions
during that period. Such large, sustained investment could be
the main reason for the success of the Montreal Protocol. The
magnitude and consistency of investment, however, can also
be construed to indicate that governments are willing to contribute because the Montreal Protocol has delivered results. In
reality, these two dynamics reinforce each other. Significant initial investment was critical to the fund’s success and the initial
success stimulated sustained investment. Figure 6 illustrates
the priority governments have accorded Montreal Protocol activities in comparison with the Environment Fund and other
earmarked funding.

Earmarked funding has increased across the United Nations
and is an important part of the budget even for specialized
agencies. The World Health Organization, for example, relied
on voluntary contributions for 72 percent of its budget in 2006–
2007.14 Assessed contributions, the hallmark of a specialized
agency status, comprised less than a third of WHO’s financial
base. This reliance on earmarks has been a controversial development as the engagement of donor governments has shifted
from unrestricted core funding to strategic investments focusing on program priorities compatible with donor agendas.
From the perspective of the recipient organizations, earmarked
funding asserts the influence and control of donor governments’ diminishing predictability and flexibility of resources as
well as the autonomy of the organization to pursue program
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Figure 5: Total contributions by biennium, excluding funding for the
Montreal Protocol, in constant USD

Similar to other UN bodies, the voluntary contributions that
make up most of UNEP’s financial basket are delivered in
two ways: either through a general contribution to core funding through the Environment Fund or through contributions
to specific elements of UNEP’s work program and projects
via earmarked funds. Earmarked funding for UNEP began in
the 1980s, grew significantly over the 1990s, and eventually
eclipsed the share of the Environment Fund during the last decade (Figure 5). Currently, two-thirds of UNEP’s budget comprises earmarked funds and only one-third comes directly from
the Environment Fund.
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Conclusion
resources while normative mandates require greater stability
and predictability of financial streams. Second, an assessment
of available versus required resources is a necessary condition
for effective environmental governance. A financial tracking
system to monitor and evaluate environmental financial flows,
volumes, and impacts is therefore urgently necessary. Third, reliability of funding needs to be improved significantly to avoid
a short-term focus and improve the ability to commit to and
implement visionary programs and activities.

In 1972, governments created the Environment Fund to enable
UNEP to serve as the anchor institution for the global environment through enticing collaboration from the rest of the UN
system and providing funds for bridging the policy-implementation gap through new revenue streams for implementation.
The Fund was the core environmental financing mechanism in
the UN system in the 1970s and 1980s. With the proliferation
of additional funds and earmarked contributions, however,
the linkage between policy goals and financing instruments
weakened, donor contributions fluctuated and decreased in
real terms, and the Fund (and even UNEP as a whole) was ultimately eclipsed by alternative financing mechanisms.

To this end, the original idea for UNEP’s Environment Fund
merits new attention. An environmental financing mechanism
for core program work could comprise contributions calculated on the basis of countries’ energy consumption. This could
transform into assessed contributions that would ensure predictable funding on a scale proportional to the relative size of
environmental impact. In addition, a scheme of voluntary contributions with a specific minimum from all countries would
provide the resources necessary to supplement existing programs and launch new and innovative initiatives.

Given the political demand for improvements in international
environmental governance, three main dynamics in environmental financing demand further attention by scholars and
governments. First, it is important to clearly articulate the
roles of institutions with environmental mandates and ensure
a more systematic and coherent division of labor in the international system. Operational activities may demand larger
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